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THE BOND COURT’S INSTITUTIONAL TRUCE 
Monica Hakimi* 
As many readers are aware, Bond v. United States1 is a quirky case. The federal government prosecuted under 
the implementing legislation for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) a betrayed wife who used chemi-
cal agents to try to harm her husband’s lover. The wife argued that, as applied to her, the implementing 
legislation violated the Tenth Amendment. She thus raised difficult questions about the scope of  the treaty 
power and of  Congress’s authority to implement treaties through the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Bond 
Court avoided those questions with a clear statement rule: “we can insist on a clear indication that Congress 
meant to reach purely local crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive language in a way that intrudes 
on the police power of  the States.”2 This resolution betrays the Court’s ambivalence about the appropriate 
limits of  the treaty power and about the Court’s own capacity to define those limits. 
The clear message from Bond is that the Court is troubled by the federalism implications of  an overly ex-
pansive treaty power but feels ill-equipped to delimit that power itself. Consider the three approaches that 
were easily available to the Court but not taken. First, the Court did not just apply the implementing legisla-
tion’s seemingly plain but expansive language to reach Bond’s conduct. All nine Justices thought that, as 
applied to Bond, the legislation risked intruding too heavily on the federalism interests at stake. 
Second, neither did the Court decide that the CWC’s implementing legislation exceeded the federal gov-
ernment’s authorities. Missouri v. Holland was itself  premised on the idea that regulating migratory birds was an 
international, not a purely local, affair. Bond picked up on that distinction. It went out of  its way to character-
ize Bond’s conduct as “purely local” and to minimize the national and international interests at stake. As 
Marty Lederman3 has explained, these moves are questionable. Yet even as the Court made them, it declined 
to find that the CWC’s implementing legislation exceeded the federal government’s treaty-related authorities. 
Third, the Court also declined to establish a generalized standard for limiting those authorities in future 
cases. Even the concurring opinions that try to establish a limiting principle are, in the end, unconvincing. 
Justice Scalia’s opinion adopts the position, articulated by Professor Rosenkranz in 2005,4 that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause authorizes legislation to “make” treaties but not to “implement” them. Yet Scalia does not 
even try to grapple with the historical evidence to the contrary.567 And he fails to offer a principled reason for 
adopting his interpretation, given that the Treaty Clause enables the government not just to make but also to 
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implement treaties—by declaring them to be self-executing. Justice Thomas’ opinion focuses on the treaty 
power itself. He argues that the treaty power may be used to “arrange intercourse with other nations, but not 
to regulate purely domestic affairs.”8 But Thomas then “acknowledge[s] that the distinction between matters 
of  international intercourse and matters of  purely domestic regulation may not be obvious in all cases.”9 And 
he does not explain why the task of  identifying the issues that are suited for international regulation falls to 
the Court. As Bill Dodge10 explains, this task is probably best left to the political branches of  government. 
The approach that the Court took in Bond ultimately allows the Court to police the use of  the treaty power 
without defining its scope—both in this case and in future cases. The clear statement rule purportedly directs 
Congress to be explicit when it uses the treaty power to regulate matters that have traditionally fallen within 
the states’ police powers. But of  course, Congress has a strong incentive not to be explicit on this point. The 
scope of  the federal government’s treaty-related authorities is still uncertain, and at least three Justices are 
prepared to limit those authorities in the interests of  federalism. To assert that a treaty’s implementing legisla-
tion is intended to regulate purely local matters is simply to tee up the legislation for judicial review, with 
potentially negative and far-reaching consequences. Moreover, as a practical matter, Congress rarely needs to 
push the envelope on the treaty power; it can almost always justify its implementing legislation under its 
better-established Article I powers. (Even the application of  the CWC’s implementing legislation can, in most 
cases, be justified under the Commerce Clause or the Define and Punish Clause.11) As a result, Congress is 
highly unlikely to try to satisfy the clear statement test in future cases. For similar reasons, the Executive 
branch has an incentive to exercise restraint when cases raise serious federalism questions. Rather than assert 
federal authority and invite judicial review, the Executive might just stay its hand. 
Finally, to the extent that cases testing the treaty power continue to come before the Court, the Court can 
resolve them case—specifically, as it resolved Bond. Bond’s method of  analysis is fairly straightforward, even 
though its application in any particular case depends on the Court’s perception that the regulated conduct is 
“purely local.” If  it is, then the conduct is beyond the implementing legislation’s reach—unless Congress takes 
the foolish and unlikely step of  stating explicitly that the legislation is intended to govern the conduct. In the 
end, then, Bond establishes a potentially stable truce among the three branches of  the federal government: so 
long as the political branches do their part to attend to federalism interests when they use or apply the treaty 
power, the Court can tinker around the edges without trying to define or impose constraints on that power. 
For now, at least, all three branches seem to have an interest in maintaining that truce. 
8 Bond, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 2103 (Thomas, J. concurring).  
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